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Abstract 
This paper introduces a model of the electoral connection in the European Parliament. Emphasizing the problem of 
common agency – wherein agents are beholden to multiple principals who cannot coordinate  – it assumes that 
national parties, European party groups, and voters are “latent principals” that differentially constrain members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs). The model proposes that the degree to which each of these principals constrain 
MEPs depends upon signals that MEPs receive from the national political arena about their electoral vulnerability. 
Re-election  seeking  MEPs  will  in  turn  cultivate  closer  connections  with  the  principal  whose  support  is  most 
important for reducing electoral vulnerability. Drawing on the second-order election model, signals about MEP 
vulnerability are  measured as a national party‟s success  in the  most recent national election, given the party‟s 
average size, governing status, and time remaining until the European election. The model predicts three broad 
outcomes. First, MEPs from large or governing parties will generally be more vulnerable as their party label suffers 
in  European  elections.  Expecting  losses,  they  should  cultivate  closer  connections  to  their  constituents  by 
emphasizing  personal  record  rather  than  party  affiliation.  Second,  MEPs  from  small  or  opposition  parties  will 
generally be less vulnerable as their party label is more successful in European elections. Expecting gains, these 
MEPs will seek to appeal to their party leaders in order to secure the safest (often only the top) place on the electoral 
list. Finally, the model predicts that systemic-level attributes such as voters‟ right to re-order the ballot should 
contribute to variation in the first two outcomes. The model‟s propositions are tested empirically with qualitative 
and quantitative evidence from 30 interviews with MEPs in 2008 and an original dataset of MEPs‟ non-roll-call 
position taking in plenary sessions during the 6
th European Parliament term.  
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Introduction 
Is  there  an  “electoral  connection”  to  the  European  Parliament?  According  to  most 
accounts of EU legislative politics, there is not (e.g., Hix 2002; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; 
Hix and Marsh 2007; Farrell and Scully 2007). The central argument is that voters perceive little 
at stake in European elections and thus cast their ballots in order to make statements about the 
national political arena rather than their preferences over EU policies (Kuecheler 1991). Parties, 
in  turn,  campaign  on  national  issues,  rendering  incumbents‟  EU  policy-making  records  and 
personal achievements in the European Parliament (EP) irrelevant to the campaign. Members of 
the  European  Parliament  (MEPs)  therefore  have  no  real  incentive  to  shape  their  legislative 
behaviors to serve citizens‟ interests. Instead, MEPs‟ political behavior is largely determined by 
their national parties, which control ballot nominations and electoral list rank, and on whose 
reputation MEPs rely for re-election.  
This perceived failure of European elections to create real accountability in the European 
Parliament – and the European Union more generally (e.g., Hix 1998; Farrell and Scully 2007) – 
is  central  to  most  work  on  the  European  Parliament.  For  instance,  the  so-called  “standard 
version” of the democratic deficit (Weiler et al. 1995), which focuses on the role of parliaments 
and elections to measure the EU against domestic democracy, hinges on the idea that an electoral 
connection does not exist.  Where elections do not work, representative government loses its 
starting point.  
There  are,  however,  at  least  three  criticisms  of  the  standard  account  of  the  electoral 
connection upon which much of the literature rests. First, it is theoretically incomplete. Voter 
behavior in European elections not only influences how parties and candidates campaign, but it 
also shapes electoral outcomes in distinctive ways. For instance, relative to their performance in 3 
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national elections, large and governing parties invariably fare worse in European elections than 
small and opposition parties (e.g., Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004; Kousser 2004; Marsh 2007). 
Thus it is not intuitive that incumbent MEPs should always tie their fates to party reputation 
alone.  
Second, it is methodologically narrow. Evidence for the view that MEPs are principally 
constrained by their national parties is based solely on roll-call records in which MEPs more 
frequently vote according to national party ideal points rather than their own preferences. In 
order  to  substantiate  this  conventional  wisdom,  however,  two  procrustean  assumptions  must 
hold: loyalty must be conceptualized as a binary phenomenon and voting must be understood as 
the most meaningful legislative behavior. Neither assumption is testable with roll-call data.  
Third,  and  most  importantly,  the  conventional  wisdom  is  difficult  to  reconcile  with 
empirical reality. Since 1999, MEPs have collectively passed several reforms to the EP rules of 
procedure, which enable them to address local constituencies during EP plenary sessions, spend 
more time in their home countries, and liaise with their national parliaments. And while MEPs 
tend to be loyal to their national parties on roll-call votes (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007) and to 
serve  their  European  party  groups  to  obtain  positions  within  the  EP  (Corbett  et  al.  2007; 
Mamadouh and Raunio 2003), evidence from this author‟s interviews reveals that, much like US 
Congressmen, MEPs also seek to mobilize and galvanize constituency support. MEPs, in short, 
behave like agents with three principals.  
To the extent that there is an electoral connection to the European Parliament, it will 
depend upon how legislators with limited resources are able to serve multiple principals with 
potentially distinct demands. Assuming that legislators‟ first goal is re-election, this paper argues 4 
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that  MEPs  will  serve  the  principal  that  can  most  effectively  insure  their  seats  in  the  EP. 
Emphasizing  the  problem  of  “common  agency”  –  wherein  agents  are  beholden  to  multiple 
principals who cannot coordinate their demands – the proposed model assumes that national 
parties, European party groups, and voters are “latent principals” that differentially constrain 
MEPs‟ legislative behavior. The degree to which MEPs are responsive to each of these principals 
depends upon signals that MEPs receive from the national political arena about their electoral 
vulnerability. Re-election seeking MEPs will thus cultivate closer connections with the principal 
whose support is most important for reducing electoral vulnerability.  
This  proposition  is  substantiated  by  evidence  from  thirty  interviews  conducted  with 
MEPs during the summer of 2008 and its generality is tested with original data on MEPs‟ non-
roll-call  position  taking  in  MEP  speeches  during  the  6
th  European  Parliament  term  (2004  – 
2009). The model is explicated and tested in sections four and five. The following two sections 
develop the theory of the conditional electoral connection.  
Second-Order Elections and Principal-Agent Relationships in the European Parliament 
The electoral connection (Mayhew 1974) is, at its core, a principal-agent theory wherein 
legislators (agents) are beholden to their electorates (principals). It departs from the notion that 
elected  officials‟  legislative  behavior  derives  largely  from  their  desire  to  win  re-election. 
Although legislators may have many goals within an assembly (e.g., pass good legislation, hold 
leadership positions, develop fruitful careers, etc.), pursuing any of these objectives is contingent 
upon holding a seat in the legislature. Re-election is therefore legislators‟ proximal goal, and 
legislators will presumably shape their political behavior to realize it.  
In  the  archetypical  case,  for  instance,  US  Congressmen  will  advertise  their  skill  and 
expertise to voters; take pleasing positions on, and claim credit for, policies of importance to 5 
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their  constituents;  and  provide  local  casework  and  spending  projects  to  pivotal  electorates 
(Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977; Fenno 1978; Johannes 1984; Cain et al. 1984, 1987). Similarly, 
legislators  will  pursue  influential  positions  within  Congress  such  as  committee  seats  and 
chairmanships through which they can create opportunities to cultivate the personal vote – “the 
portion  of  a  candidate‟s  electoral  support  which  originates  in  his  or  her  personal  qualities, 
qualifications, activities, and record” (Cain et al. 2005).  The electoral connection thus implies an 
institutionally induced relationship between voters and legislators. 
In the European Parliament, however, the electoral connection appears to lose its starting 
point.  Strong  national  political  parties  control  ballot  access  and  rank  while  European  party 
groups set the political agenda and allocate leadership positions within the EP (Hix, Noury and 
Roland 2007; Mamadouh and Raunio 2003; Corbett et al. 2007; McElroy 2006). To be sure, the 
particular  institutional  environment  in  which  MEPs  operate  has  led  scholars  to  discount  the 
principal-agent relationship between voters and MEPs.
3 As Hix, Raunio and Scully (2003) note, 
“this  area  remains  largely  neglected,  perhaps  because  of  widely  held  assumptions  that  any 
electoral connection to the EP is weak because of the way elections (do not) work” (194).  
Scholars commonly dismiss the electoral connection on the grounds that voters equate 
elections to the European Parliament (EP) to “super opinion polls” (Blondel et al. 1988) with 
little substantive impact. European elections have been characterized as “second-order national 
contests” fought by national parties on national issues that are irrelevant to the EP or European 
integration in general (Reif and Schmitt 1980; van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Schmitt and 
Thomassen  1999).  If  voters  remain  largely  unaware  of  the  European  Parliament  and  its 
                                                 
3 This is not entirely unlike parties‟ roles in certain national electoral systems. There is, however, well-evidenced 
variation in party control over ballot access, list rank, and intraparty competition more generally in parliamentary 
democracies (e.g., Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984, 1987; Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 1999; Uslander 1985).  6 
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significance, then they are unlikely to punish MEPs for reneging on electoral promises or for 
taking policy positions on European issues that are incongruent to their own. MEPs are thus 
unconstrained by electorates.  
Instead, second-order elections (SOE) are believed to strongly tie MEPs to their national 
parties. Citizens are less participatory because they believe that little is at stake in European 
elections (Curtice 1989; Niedermayer 1990). To increase turnout, parties place national issues at 
the  center  of  their  campaigns  (Blumler  and  Fox  1982),  which  reduces  incumbent  MEPs‟ 
opportunities  to  claim  credit  for  EU-level  achievements.  Furthermore,  the  EP‟s  role  in 
policymaking is largely divorced from national and local contexts, which makes it impossible to 
promise or return particularistic benefits to constituents. And since MEPs‟ daily work in the EP 
is practically invisible to national constituencies and does not in itself merit national popularity, 
there  are  few  possibilities  for  meaningful  position  taking.  MEPs  must  therefore  rely  on  the 
quality of their national party label to win European elections, and this gives national party 
leaders tremendous control over politics within the European Parliament.  
In accordance with this  conventional view of SOE effects, much work on legislative 
behavior in the EP implicitly assumes that national parties act as MEPs‟ sole principal. To be 
sure, national parties hold a monopoly over the electoral incentives and sanctions that determine 
legislators‟ careers, and MEPs respond with voting discipline and legislative loyalty on the floor 
(Hix 2002; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Farrell and Scully 2007). Indeed, Hix (2001, 2002, 
2004, 2009) convincingly demonstrates that MEPs are highly responsive to their national parties 
during roll call votes. His consistent results show that, despite European party groups‟ control 
over leadership positions and political resources in the EP, MEPs will defect from their European 
groups when national parties‟ policy locations and European party group ideological positions 7 
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are  incongruent.  The  main  implication  is  that  national  parties  alone  shape  MEPs‟  electoral 
incentive, and so MEPs remain uniquely faithful as agents of their national parties on the floor of 
the EP (Hix 2002).  
These arguments, however, are based upon an incomplete reading of the SOE effects. In 
addition to characterizing the nature of election campaigns, SOE in Europe also yield reliable 
predictions of voter behavior and election outcomes. Citizens shrug off strategic voting during 
European elections and instead tend vote “with their hearts” (Reif 1984; Reif and Schmitt 1980) 
for parties that approximate their ideology regardless  of their  apparent governing  capability. 
Citizens also vote “with the boot” (van der Eijk, Franklin and Oppenhuis 1996) to protest and 
punish national governing party performance (Hix and Marsh 2007).  
This  voting  behavior  produces  outcomes  that  differ  markedly  from  those  typifying 
national elections. As the aggregate outcomes in Table 1 show, relative to their performance in 
national elections, large parties and governing parties have fared worse than small parties and 
opposition parties in every European election since 1979 (van der Eijk, Franklin, and Oppenhuis 
1996; Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004; Kousser 2004; Marsh 1998, 2003, 2007; Hix and Marsh 
2007).  Thus,  contrary  to  the  traditional,  “campaign-centric”  reading  of  SOE  effects,  this 
“outcome-centric”  view  suggests  that  toeing  party  lines  may  not  always  be  in  MEPs‟  best 
electoral interests. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Taken together, second-order elections‟ effects on the structure of electoral campaigns 
and the nature of election outcomes present a puzzle: If MEPs are strongly tied to their national 
party reputations in European elections, but these reputations vary predictably according to party 8 
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size and governing status, how can incumbent MEPs most effectively secure re-election? What 
shapes the electoral incentive?  
 
Common Agency and Electoral Vulnerability: Shaping the Electoral Incentive 
To the extent that national party leaders control ballot access and rank, national party 
loyalty is necessary to secure a safe place on the ballot. But it is not sufficient. Even closed-list 
leaders  amount  to  more  than  party  loyalists.  List-toppers  most  often  include  accomplished 
incumbents who are both highly familiar with the EU policymaking and highly familiar to broad 
segments of the electorate. The safest spots on European electoral lists are frequently awarded to 
incumbents  who  are  known  for  their  roles  in  European  politics  (e.g.,  Members  of  the  EP 
Bureau), national politics (e.g., former Ministers), cultural venues (e.g., journalists, athletes, and 
actors), and in local politics (e.g., leaders of trade unions and professional associations).  
Securing  re-election  is  presumably  more  complex  than  voting  with  national  party 
preferences  on  roll-calls.  Re-election  seeking  incumbents  must  also  cultivate  a  variety  of 
relationships with groups other than their national parties, as well as a strong personal record of 
local and European service, independent of loyalty to their national party label. As a newly 
socialized  Czech  MEP  in  the  transnational  European  People‟s  Party  –  European  Democrats 
(EPP-ED) made clear during one interview:    
I always try to be in my constituency as often as possible, and this means not just going 
for election campaigns. If you go just for campaigns you have already lost…I go to 
organizations,  rural  youth  organizations,  women‟s  associations,  business  sectors.  I 
always try to have more than 50 percent of my contacts and meetings outside of the 
party. 
Most of the MEPs interviewed during the summer of 2008 shared this preoccupation with 
“constant campaigning.” Twenty-four out of thirty MEPs stated unequivocally that they “think 9 
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constantly about re-election.”
4 Though the MEPs offered different accounts of how they pursue 
re-election.  Several  interviewees  cited  media  relationships  as  their  central  focus.  A  Danish 
Liberal for the Alliance of European Democrats (ALDE) noted:  
We try to think, „what would be the good story in Denmark?‟ And sometimes we will 
make very small stories from down here [Brussels]…seem very important to public 
interest in Denmark to persuade journalists to write about it. And not always the big 
things because the big things down here are very technical… 
 
Many others, like the Czech MEP cited above, emphasized constituency service during 
trips home. In fact, two thirds of the MEPs interviewed plainly argued that monthly plenary 
sessions be moved from Strasbourg to Brussels so they might allocate more time to this type of 
service.
5  Plenary sessions also figured prominently into the discussions with MEPs for another 
reason: speaking on the floor affords legislators a key opportunity  to clarify their positions on 
relevant policy issues. Asked to elaborate on a similar point, one MEP responded:  
MEP: I speak in plenary when I want to stress that an issue impacts my region.    
Author: To whom do you stress it? 
MEP: To the constituency, of course. I break down what we are doing here in Europe 
and what result it has for the constituency. That is very important.  
 
Another MEP revealed his “strategy” for plenary speeches:  
 
…in Plenary you have to be clear, because the journalists are there and it‟s the 
journalists who are supposed to  be the medium  between  you  and the larger 
audience at home. And they have to get it right.  
                                                 
4 I conducted semi-scheduled interviews: all lead questions were worded the same but I tailored follow-ups to the 
specific response. In this case, the exact lead question to which MEPs responded was “Many observers of the US 
Congress note that Members of Congress constantly think about re-election. Would you say that you constantly 
think about re-election to the European Parliament?” 
5 Eliminating Strasbourg plenary sessions is a perennial issue “owned” by the conservative EPP-ED, who oppose it 
on  economic  grounds.  My  interviews  sampled  MEPs  from  each  of  the  six  European  party  groups  and  one 
nonattached member, and vocal opponents of Strasbourg plenary sessions are present in every party. 10 
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Loyalty to European party groups and to national party leaders also played into MEPs‟ 
concerns, but the latter to a much greater extent. Indeed, three MEPs claimed that service to the 
European party  group  was  only  electorally important  when it raised  MEPs‟ visibility in  the 
national parties as European “experts.” But the vast majority of the interviewees noted that their 
national  party  leaders  consider  “expertise”  secondary  in  importance  to  “visibility”  at  home. 
Seven interviewed MEPs claimed that committee chairmanships and other leadership positions 
within the EP serve visibility; however, the vast majority believed that loyalty to the European 
party group is a procedural norm that is not related to electoral viability.  
The MEPs themselves thus lend doubt to the conventional scholarly wisdom that national 
parties are their sole principal and their sole concern. Moreover, this evidence challenges the 
more fundamental assumption of a “null” relationship between voters and MEPs. These accounts 
instead lend credence to a familiar assumption about US Members of Congress, who maintain an 
electoral connection even though it is well established that most Americans possesses too little 
meaningful  political  knowledge  to  truly  hold  them  accountable  (e.g.,  Converse  1964;  Delli 
Carpini  and  Keeter  1996).  Legislators  nonetheless  serve  voters  either  out  of  normative 
obligations (Pitkin 1967) or for fear that, at any moment, voters could acquire the knowledge 
needed hold them to account (e.g., Mann 1978; Jacobson 1987, 1989). 
Re-election  seeking  MEPs  may  thus  be  conceptualized  as  agents  with  three  latent 
principals – national parties, European party groups, and voters. Each offers distinctive rewards 
to responsive agents, which may be useful to re-election seeking MEPs. National parties control 
ballot access and rank; European party groups allocate key leadership positions through which 
MEPs can shape the political agenda; voters cast ballots for party lists or individuals whose 11 
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names and reputations they know and trust. MEPs receive these rewards to the extent that they 
serve their principals‟ interests. To the extent that MEPs fail to meet their principals‟ demands, 
they may be punished. National party leaders can remove incumbents from initial safe positions 
on the electoral list; European party groups  can work to withhold committee chairmanships; 
some citizens may not turn out to vote, while others who do may vote “with the boot.”   
On one hand, serving these principals is costly. Local constituencies, European party 
groups and national parties may have competing demands, and MEPs possess too few resources 
to permit all to be satisfied equally. On the other hand, these principals face a coordination 
problem:  national  parties,  European  party  groups,  and  voters  cannot  collectively  monitor  or 
constrain  MEPs‟  political  behavior  because  they  hold  different  preferences,  pursue  different 
objectives,  are  not  equally  attentive  to  MEPs‟  work,  and  possess  different  formal  means  of 
control. This collective action problem of “common agency” means that agents have incentives 
to shirk their responsibilities to the weakest principals. That is, without coordination, individual 
principals will offer different payoff structures to agents, who in turn compare the offers and 
respond  only  to  the  principal  awarding  the  highest  payoff  or  threatening  the  most  austere 
sanctions. In this way, MEPs can maximize their payoffs with minimal costs.  
Taking the electoral incentive as an explanatory lever, I assume that incumbent MEPs are 
“single-minded seekers of re-election” (Mayhew 1974). Although MEPs may certainly wish to 
pass good policies, obtain leadership positions, and so on, all such objectives require that MEPs 
first secure re-election. To do so, MEPs must minimize their electoral vulnerability – that is, they 
must secure the position on their party‟s electoral list which is most likely to win a seat after 
votes are tallied.  12 
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MEPs face two sorts of electoral vulnerability. First, MEPs are vulnerable to the extent 
that  their  personal  reputations  and  records  are  weak.  The  balance  of  positive  and  negative 
influences on an incumbent‟s personal record determines his or her placement on the electoral 
list  and  constitutes  “personal  vulnerability.”An  increase  in  personal  vulnerability  may  result 
from  lack  of  name  recognition;  public  scandals;  failure  to  appeal  to  supportive  organized 
interests; or fallout with party leaders. Second, MEPs are vulnerable to the extent that their 
national party labels are vulnerable. That is, they are subject to “party vulnerability.” Given that 
European electorates disproportionally punish parties according to their size (i.e., vote share in 
most recent election) and governing status (i.e., at time of EP election), national parties can 
reasonably estimate their vote shares in European elections. Smaller or opposition parties that are 
less exposed to protest voting can expect larger overall vote shares than they received in the most 
recent elections, and are virtually guaranteed a seat in the EP (Hix and Marsh 2007). Larger 
parties and governing parties expect losses to their vote and seat shares relative to their shares in 
the most recent election, such that there is less security in higher placement on their electoral 
lists.  
Legislators‟  and  parties‟  reputations  are  developed  and  devastated  at  home.  MEPs 
therefore draw on signals from the national political arena to estimate their own risk. Personal 
vulnerability is captured by an MEP‟s electoral list rank during the previous European election; 
party  vulnerability  is  reflected  in  an  MEP‟s  national  party  performance  in  the  most  recent 
national  election.  Party  vulnerability,  moreover,  has  a  galvanizing  effect  on  personal 
vulnerability: higher-ranked incumbents from parties that expect to lose seats in the upcoming 
European election suffer more personal vulnerability than equivalently-ranked incumbents from 
safe parties.  13 
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To understand how these two types of vulnerability interact, it is useful to conceptualize 
them  in  terms  of  probabilities.  For  instance,  consider  a  hypothetical  electoral  list  with  4 
placements.  Given  an  MEP‟s  previous  list  rank,  the  MEP  estimates  that  she  has  a  certain 
probability of attaining each place on that list. These add to 1.00; formally:  Pr(1
st) + Pr(2
nd) + 
Pr(3
rd) + Pr(4
th) = 1. Similarly, the party has a unique probability that it will attain each seat on 
the list. These also add to one, such that Pr(win 1
st) + Pr(win 2
nd) + Pr(win 3
rd) + Pr(win 4
th) = 1. 
Taken together, an MEP‟s electoral vulnerability is the probability that he or she will be placed 
on the list given the probability that the party will in fact win that seat.
6 
The types of vulnerability that MEPs face in turn shape their strategies regarding how 
best to reduce their risk of loss.  That is, the electoral connection is conditional on electoral 
vulnerability.  The  logic  is  straightforward.  Personally  vulnerable  MEPs  a re  nested  within 
vulnerable parties and institutional contexts that mediate their decisions about which principal to 
serve.  Given  both  the  initial  level  of  personal  vulnerability  and  its  contextually  “weighted” 
levels, MEPs will cultivate closer relationships with the principals that can most likely reduce 
their electoral risk.  
 
A Spot Check: Electoral Connections, 2004 – 2008  
The  MEPs  interviewed  for  this  study  generally  agreed  that  among  their  three  latent 
principals,  only  two  –  national  parties  and  voters  –  are  actively  relevant  to  their  electoral 
fortunes. To which principal will MEPs be more responsive?  
The second-order elections model yields reliable predictions of parties‟ expected vote 
shares in European elections relative to national elections (see Table 1). Governing and large 
                                                 
6 That is, Pr(1
st)×Pr(win 1
st) + Pr(2
nd)×Pr(win 2
nd) + Pr(3
rd)×Pr(win 3
rd) + Pr(4
th)×Pr(win 4
th) = 1 14 
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parties are more vulnerable and therefore increase the electoral risk to candidates. The opposite 
is true of small and opposition parties – they are less vulnerable and seats in the EP are nearly 
guaranteed (Hix and Marsh 2007).  
MEPs from governing or large parties thus face incentives to distinguish themselves from 
their parties, whose labels will likely suffer in the next European election. The opposite is true of 
small or opposition parties – they are less vulnerable and a seat in the EP is nearly guaranteed 
(Hix and Marsh 2007), so these MEPs may rely more on party label. These general relationships, 
however, necessarily depend upon personal vulnerability (i.e., list rank). Where MEPs from large 
parties  are  placed  low  on  electoral  lists,  responsiveness  to  constituents  may  shield  against 
partisan swings. Where MEPs from large parties are ranked high on electoral lists, they are free 
from  the  whims  of  partisan  shifts.  Nonetheless,  high-ranked  MEPs  from  large  or  governing 
parties do risk certain damages to their own reputations. Since these MEPs act as the public 
“faces” of the party, they incur potential costs to their own  records when associated with  a 
suffering party label and when their party list does not perform well under their names. For this 
reason, high-ranked incumbents from large or governing parties will likely focus on serving the 
interests of the party leadership to ensure future rewards.  
Thus, among large or governing parties (read: where party vulnerability is high): 
H1a: High-ranked (low personal vulnerability) MEPs will forge closer connections with 
party leaders. 
H1b: Low-ranked (high personal vulnerability) MEPs will forge closer connections with 
voters. 
 15 
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The opposite trend should characterize small and opposition parties. High-ranked MEPs 
in these parties also do not need to shield themselves against partisan swings. However, since 
their party label will tend to gain currency in European elections vis-à-vis national elections, 
high-ranked  MEPs  face  little  cost  to  their  own  reputations  as  the  public  faces  of  the  party. 
Therefore, we should expect high ranking MEPs to spread their party‟s reputation among voters 
in order to increase the magnitude of the favorable partisan swing that can bring additional seats 
to that party. Low ranking MEPs from small parties, in turn, can benefit from these partisan 
swings. These candidates will likely vie for a better list position by appealing to party leaders  for 
higher rankings as a means of capturing these extra seats.  
Therefore, among small or opposition parties (read: where party vulnerability is low): 
H2a: High-ranked MEPs will forge closer connections with voters. 
H2b: Low-ranked MEPs will forge closer connections with party leaders. 
 
These general relationships are represented in Table 2, below.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Data collected during 30 semi-scheduled interviews with MEPs in the summer of 2008 
permit two preliminary tests that will serve as a spot check on these general hypotheses. The 
semi-schedule interview technique provides for standardized lead-in questions, asked to all 30 
respondents,  and  improvised  follow-up  questions.  One  of  the  five  standardized  questions 
inquired about constituency service. It read, “How often do you meet with constituents to discuss 
your work and/or their interests in Europe?” 100 percent of MEPs answered this question, and 
their responses were coded on a scale of 1 to 3, where 1 represents “infrequent contact” and 3 16 
A.J. Abbarno 
indicates “very  frequent contact.”
7 As a first  validity  check,  Table 3 locates each of the 30 
respondents, labeled by their rank on the 2004 electoral list, according to their national party size 
and frequency of constituency service.  
[Table 3 about here] 
The results  generally  reflect  the hypothesized relationships  between vulnerability  and 
constituency connections. In the upper-left quadrant, we expect highly vulnerable MEPs from 
large or governing parties to be more responsive to their party leaders than to their constituents. 
Half of the expectation is borne out in Table 3, where these high-ranking MEPs tend to spend 
less  time  discussing  political  matters  with  their  constituents  than  lower-ranking  MEPs  from 
parties of similar size (upper-right quadrant). There are outliers: two “3
rd” ranked candidates in 
the upper-right cell boast “frequent” constituency service. Generally, however, the low-ranked 
MEPs from large or governing parties cluster in this area, where we expect greater connections 
with constituencies.  
We expect similar attentiveness to voters among high-ranked MEPs from small parties. 
These MEPs are largely found in the lower-right quadrant, which lends supports the notion of 
constituency  service  among  those  MEPs  who  seek  to  increase  the  number  of  fringe  seats 
resulting from partisan swings. Finally, the lower-left quadrant generally supports the hypothesis 
that low-ranking MEPs from small parties will not engage in constituency service.  
The  second validity check on the conditional electoral  connection theory  follows the 
same logic used for the first. In place of constituency service, however, I employ a measure of 
responsiveness to national party leaders. The measure is the percentage of roll call votes on 
                                                 
7 Specifically, 1 = infrequent contact (“never” to “every few months”); 2 = somewhat frequently (“every month”); 3 
= frequently (“every few weeks” to “every week”).  17 
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which the MEP voted in accordance with his or her national party‟s issue position. The latter is 
assumed to equal the vote (i.e., for or against) cast by the national party delegation leader in the 
MEP‟s European party group.
8 The results appear in Table 4, below.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 reveals an unsurprising trend – most MEPs are very loyal to their national parties 
on roll call votes. This claim is well substantiated and lays at the foundation of most recent 
studies of the EP (e.g., Hix 2001, 2002, 2004, 2009). In light of Table 3, however, it is difficult 
to claim that MEPs are not responsive to their voters – and, more basically, it is wrong to claim 
that  they  behave  as  if  they  are  unconstrained  by  voters.  Together  these  tables  suggest  that 
“loyalty,” is not a binary phenomenon, as most studies employing roll call votes alone require. 
That  is,  MEPs  are  able  to  serve  multiple  principles  through  distinct,  mutually  nonexclusive 
means.  
Nonetheless, constituency service and party loyalty as measured in Tables 3 and 4 are not 
comparable along the same metric; it is difficult to make comparative statements regarding the 
conditions under which MEPs will be more or less responsive to a single principal. The next 
section expands the conditional electoral connection theory and introduces a statistical model 
with which to better discern these relationships.  
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The original source for this measure is the now defunct oversight site, “How MEPs Work.”  18 
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The Conditional Electoral Connection 
The evidence presented thus far reveals that MEPs are, in fact, responsive to voters as 
well as to their national parties. However, these conclusions ought to be deemed tentative until 
two issues are resolved.  First, the indicators of roll-call vote behavior and constituency service – 
as employed in the two validity checks above – are not comparable measures and therefore do 
not permit us to conclude that MEPs will be more responsive to one principal or the other under 
different conditions of vulnerability. Second, the findings ought to be read conservatively since 
they rely on 30 face-to-face interviews and may not represent MEPs‟ general behavioral patterns.  
The “condition” of the electoral connection is that MEPs will serve the principal that is 
most able to reduce their electoral vulnerability. However, MEPs may respond differently to 
their vulnerability under different circumstances. For instance, electoral systems may strongly 
influence the relationship between principals, agents, and vulnerability. Candidates for European 
elections come to be positioned on electoral lists in a similar fashion across national parties. 
Party leaders – either on their own or while caucusing with party members – determine which 
candidates will be placed on the ballot and where they will be ranked. The degree to which 
candidates  are  bound  to  those  positions,  however,  depends  upon  national  electoral  systems. 
Table 5 reveals considerable variation in electoral formulas used in European elections. Several 
countries employ “open” and “ordered-list” systems, in which voters may re-rank candidates 
and/or weight their votes in favor of candidates according to their preferences. These systems 
encourage  intraparty  competition  for  preference  votes,  and  thereby  render  low-ranked 
incumbents less vulnerable than equivalently-ranked incumbents in other systems. 
[Table 5 about here] 19 
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Additionally,  MEPs‟  sense  of  vulnerability  is  largely  conditional  on  their  career 
ambitions (e.g., Scarrow 1997). An MEP who wishes to pursue a ministerial position in national 
government will likely be less concerned with her rank on the European electoral list than an 
MEP who wishes to hold the EP Presidency. These additional conditions on the nature of the 
electoral connection permit richer hypotheses regarding MEPs‟ legislative behavior and whom it 
serves. Indeed, the expected patterns of agency proposed in H1a – H2b differ when we take 
account of these conditions. For instance, legislators elected through electoral systems that foster 
intra-party  competition  and  personal  vote-seeking  (Cain  et  al.  2005)  should  promote  greater 
responsiveness to constituent interests regardless of vulnerability. Specifically,  
H3: MEPs elected under systems that promote intraparty competition will forge closer 
connections with their constituents.  
 
By contrast, MEPs who desire to return to national politics should engage in greater party 
service than MEPs who wish to flourish in the EP. Individuals with the former interests will be 
preoccupied with securing a strong “counter-offer” in the national legislature or government, and 
will likely express far greater loyalty to the national party – which controls career paths – than to 
constituents. Thus,  
H4: MEPs who seek office in national government will forge closer connections with 
party leaders.  
 
One final possibility is that national party loyalty and responsiveness to the constituency 
are strongly related. Given that “personal vulnerability” is a summary measure of the plausible 
reasons behind a candidate‟s position on the electoral list, MEPs may grow more responsive to 
constituents  when  they  have  been  disloyal  to  their  parties.  In  this  sense,  constituency 20 
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responsiveness  is  a  safety  net  directly  linked  to  faltering  MEP-national  party  relations. 
Specifically,  
H5: As MEPs increasingly defect from their national parties on roll call votes, they will 
forge stronger connections with voters.  
 
Data and Measurement  
The Dependent Variable 
To which principals MEPs are beholden is not fully assessable with roll-call records. 
Loyalty is not a binary variable. While legislators may only cast one vote, there are numerous 
ways to qualify, trade, or justify a single vote through other means. Moreover, party and personal 
reputations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A legislator can easily take up positions that 
endear her to the constituency while still toeing party lines. But roll call voting records do not 
permit  us  to  observe  the  nuances  of  position-taking  in  legislative  behavior.  Furthermore,  as 
Carrubba et al. (2006) argue, selection bias is especially pernicious in EP roll call samples. Roll 
call  votes  are  more  frequently  taken  on  resolutions  than  legislative  proposals  and  tend  to 
overestimate party cohesion due to high absenteeism.   
Moreover,  voting  in  plenary  is  not  the  only  meaningful  legislative  behavior.  This  is 
particularly  true  of  the  European  context,  where  process  is  as,  if  not  more,  important  than 
product.  Roll  call  votes  on  the  floor  of  Strasbourg  plenary  sessions  are  often  formal 
acknowledgements of deals struck in European political group pre-plenary meetings held during 
the preceding week (Corbett et al. 2007). At these meetings, national party delegations in the EP 
coordinate with their home offices and clarify their voting intentions to European party group 
leaders (ibid).  21 
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This sort of political maneuvering is often assumed away in roll call analyses because 
political scientists can‟t observe what happens behind the scenes. MEPs, however, deliver public 
speeches on a wide variety of topics on an almost daily basis. As a consequence, MEPs may 
make statements that are either symbolic or strategic. Speeches about European politics contain 
more detailed information than simple yes or no votes and are likely to reveal preference data on 
both the political maneuvers invisible to roll call data, and the issues that never make it to roll 
call in the first place (Proksch and Slapin 2008).  
Moreover, unlike roll call voting loyalty – which may derive equivalently from cohesion 
or coercion – the expression of loyalty in legislative speeches may be located in the speeches‟ 
target audiences. Indeed, MEPs tend to view speeches as important position-taking mechanisms. 
When asked whether he uses floor time to express loyalty to his political party, one MEP plainly 
responded:  
No, no. I am loyal to them when I vote and that is enough. On the floor I must 
explain my votes to the constituents, and how voting in favor or against makes me 
loyal to them too. Sometimes I must explain why I could not be loyal to them.
9 
 
Identifying the target audiences in legislative speeches permits a better comparison of 
MEP  responsiveness  to  their  constituents  and  to  their  national  party  leaders.  MEPs  have  a 
reasonable expectation that they are monitored by their national parties, and media coverage of 
Strasbourg plenary sessions may enhance MEPs‟ belief that constituents pay attention. Given 
condensed speaking time, MEPs may not be able to rhetorically satisfy both constituent and 
party interests in a single speech. Deciding how to speak – and for whom to speak – is thus a 
costly choice.  
                                                 
9 Author interview with Spanish MEP, 14 June 2008. 22 
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The latent construct underlying my dependent variable is the tradeoff an MEP makes 
between expressing loyalty to her national party and expressing loyalty to her constituents in 
legislative  speeches.  This  tradeoff  reflects  how  MEPs  “calculate”  loyalties  and  can  indicate 
when, and under what circumstances MEPs tend to respond more to one principal than another.  
To  capture  this  tradeoff,  I  employ  as  my  primary  dependent  variable  the  ratio  of 
references that an MEP makes to his/her voters/constituency and references an MEP makes to 
his/her national party during legislative speeches. This “ratio of references” (ROR) measure is 
derived from the content analysis of all MEP speeches during the 6
th EP term (up to January 
2009).
10 Specifically, I constructed a word count dataset with key words and phrases as rows and 
MEPs as columns.  To tap national party references, the content analysis program counted 
mentions of 1) the MEP‟s national party name and 2) the phrase “my party” in each speech. To 
tap constituency references, the program counted references to 1) “voters,” 2) variations on “my 
constituency” (e.g., “my constituents”), and 3) references to intermediary associations such as 
“trade unions.” For each MEP, the number of “constituency references” was compared to the 
number  of  “party  references,”  yielding  a  ratio  that  indicates  MEPs‟  average  “target  of 
representation”:  
Representation Target =   
The  dependent  variable  is  bounded  between  -1  and  1,  where  -1  indicates  exclusive 
representation  of  national  party  in  speeches  and  1  indicates  exclusive  representation  of 
                                                 
10 Following Proksch and Slapin (2008), I employ Will Lowe‟s jfreq program to search and collect keywords and 
phrases. The program is available from http://people.iq.harvard.edu/~wlowe/Software.html. I was able to compile a 
comparable dataset using the “Python” program: http://people.iq.harvard.edu/~wlowe/PyContent.html.   23 
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constituents  in  legislative  speeches.  Finally,  where  the  dependent  variable  equals  0,  MEPs 
referred as many times to their party as they did to their constituents.  
Individual-Level Variables 
Data with which to measure individual-level variables was drawn from two sources. The 
majority  of  my  measures  derive  from  my  original  dataset  of  MEP  careers,  which  includes 
information ranging from patterns of voting loyalty and cohesion, to committee positions and 
transfers to seniority and MEP electoral list rank in previous European elections (i.e., 1999 and 
2004). The main individual level variable included here is “RANK2004” which lists the electoral 
list  position  of  candidates  for  EP  elections  in  2004  and  is  intended  to  proxy  for  “personal 
vulnerability. Since rules differ across parties and across countries regarding how many names 
may be included on an electoral list, my measure of list rank is weighted by the total number of 
names included on each national party‟s electoral list. A candidate ranking 3
rd on a list of 6 is 
presumably less safe than a candidate ranking 3
rd on a list of 12.
11  
I also included several individual-level controls which could impact speech counts. First, 
I controlled for MEPs‟ loyalty to their national parties (“PARTY LOYALTY”) in roll call votes by 
calculating the percent of roll call votes on which MEPs voted with their national party. For this 
measure, as well as my second control variable, progressive ambition (“AMBITION”), I employ 
the Farrell et al. (2006) Survey of MEPs. The survey contains data on 255 MEPs in the 6
th 
European  Parliament  (2004  –  2009).  “Ambition”  is  a  dummy  variable  that  captures  MEP 
responses to a question regarding where they would like to work “next.” MEPs were coded “1” 
when they indicated a preference for national government and received a code of 0 otherwise. 
Finally, I control for “turnover” rate among MEPs in each party. I assume that where turnover is 
                                                 
11 I subtracted the weighted measure from 1 such that larger values represent higher ranks. For instance, in the 
example given, [1 – (3/6) = .5] < [1-(3/12) = .75].   24 
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high, constituency and party loyalty are less electorally relevant since parties lose some control 
because of their need to fill as many seats as possible.  
Contextual Variables 
At the systemic-level, party vulnerability is captured by two variables. First, following 
convention (Ringe and Koepke 2005; Marsh 2003, 2007; Hix and Marsh 2007), “PARTY SIZE” 
is measured as an MEP‟s national party‟s vote share in the most recent national election. Second, 
“OPPOSITION” is coded 1 where the party is in opposition, and 0 where in government. In this 
sense, party vulnerability captures the potential gains or losses a large or governing national 
party can expect in European elections relative to national elections, as predicted by the second-
order elections model.  
Second,  the  extent  to  which  an  electoral  system  encourages  personal  vote-seeking 
incentives  (“PERSONAL  VOTE”)  is  measured  with  the  Shugart  and  Carey  (1995)  index.  This 
three-item  index measures  party leaders control over access  to  the ballot,  whether votes are 
pooled across the party or across some sub-unit of the party (e.g., electoral list or candidates), 
and whether citizens are able to cast more than a single vote. Where party leaders have full 
control over nominations, where votes are pooled across the party, and where citizens have only 
one vote, the index takes a value of 3 – the least amount of personal vote-seeking incentives. 
Alternatively, where party leaders have virtually no control over nominations (e.g., primaries in 
the US), votes can be transferred from one candidate to another, and citizens have more than one 
vote to cast (e.g., for a party and for a candidate, or for two candidates, etc.), the index takes a 
value of 9 – the greatest amount of personal vote-seeking incentives. Different combinations 
yield intermediate values, but they are coded such that higher values reflect greater incentives to 
cultivate the personal vote.  25 
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Statistical Methodology  
  Because the thing that I wish to measure is at the individual-level measure – MEPs‟ 
responsiveness to different principals – and the things hypothesized to affect it are at both the 
individual and systemic-level,  I prefer a multilevel modeling technique, which allows me to 
explore causal heterogeneity while also limiting error.  
Multilevel models permit the incorporation of contextual variables into the individual-
level equation without assuming a deterministic relationship between them. That is, multilevel 
models  permit  first  an  assessment  of  what  systemic-factors  explain  average  propensity  to 
respond to a given principal, and second what systemic-factors can explain the relative weights 
or slopes of the individual-level independent variables. In this sense, the model intuitively and 
appropriately (from a statistical point of view)  integrates party and personal vulnerability as 
antecedents of responsiveness.  
 
And at the contextual-level, the equation for the individual-level intercept:  
 
And the contextual-level equations for the individual-level regression weights : 
 
 
 
 
The model is specified so that the individual-level slope and individual-level intercept are 
modeled identically at the contextual-level. This is because the contextual factors may not only 
influence the differential role that personal vulnerability (i.e., Rank), party loyalty and ambition 26 
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play in determining inter-MEP differences in incidence rates of plenary speeches, but also the 
average outputs in terms of speech and responsiveness across national parties as well.  
Results 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 presents both the individual-level “Model 1” and the fully specified “Model 2.” 
All level-1 predictors achieve significance at conventional levels. The intercept value of -.219 
indicates that MEPs‟ loyalties generally favor the national party over the constituency when all 
other values are held to zero.
12 However, more vulnerable MEPs will tend to target the party less 
– in favor of ordinary voters – by .072 for every increase in list rank. The same is true for roll-
call loyalists. Indeed, contrary to Hypothesis 5, MEPs who are loyal to their parties on roll call 
votes tend to increase their emphasis on voters in legislative speeches. This is not the case for 
MEPs who wish to hold office in national government – in accordance with Hypothesis 4, these 
incumbents tend to favor their national parties 13.1% more than EP careerists during legislative 
speeches.  
However, Model 1 is incomplete. The variance components (the estimated covariance of 
the randomly varying individual-level intercept, β0j, across contextual units) for this modelare 
statistically significant, indicating that there is a significant amount of variation in the dependent 
variable across contextual units when controlling only for the individual-level attributes of the 
MEPs. Put simply, the model is not correctly specified until contextual-factors are included. The 
                                                 
12 The level-1 predictors have been centered to provide intuitive meanings behind the ceteris paribus condition. List 
rank is centered on its median (i.e., the middle of the list); Ambition‟s zero-value indicates an EP careerist; and roll 
call loyalty is centered on its mean.  27 
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fact that contextual variation is present when fitting a model with only individual-level predictors 
is a strong confirmation of the multilevel model approach.  
In  Model  2,  with  the  contextual  components  included,  the  variance  components  are 
smaller. This means that the contextual-level variables in this model have accounted for some of 
the cross-sysetm variation in the dependent variable that Model 1 did not. It should be noted that 
Model 2 is a significantly better fit than Model 1. Subtracting the deviances and dividing by the 
differences in the degrees of freedom is equivalent to a chi-squared test insofar as Model 1 is 
nested within Model 2, wherein the latter‟s contextual effects are „constrained‟ to zero. Model 2 
ths provides a significantly better fit to the data than Model 1. 
In Model 2, the cross-level interaction terms largely achieve statistical significance at 
conventional  levels.  The  level-1  predictors  remain  highly  significant,  though  there  are 
considerable differences. The measures of party vulnerability  –  party size and opposition – 
reveal interesting influences on the intercept. For every percentage increase in an MEP‟s party‟s 
vote share in the last national election, we see a 1.9% increase in the dependent variable. This  
indicates that, ceteris paribus, MEPs from larger parties tend to speak to constituents rather than 
party leaders in legislative speeches. The effect is even larger among national opposition party 
MEPs, who take positions on behalf of voters 2.1% more than MEPs from governing parties. 
Finally, and unsurprisingly, the effects of intraparty competition on speech behavior comports 
with predictions. For every unit increase in personal vote-seeking incentives, there is a 15.1 
percent increase in the ratio of references favoring constituents over parties.  
These contextual features also impact individual-level slopes. Examining the effects on 
“List rank” (i.e., personal vulnerability) clarify the influence. Party size and opposition status 28 
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have opposite effects. Thus, for every one percentage gain in an MEP‟s party vote share in the 
last national election (party size), the ratio decreases by 4.5 percent. This indicates that high-
ranked MEPs from vulnerable parties tend to favor parties over constituents. Contrariwise, MEPs 
from opposition parties who are highly ranked tend to speak to constituents 10.7 percent less 
than vulnerable MEPs from governing parties. This in turn suggests that safe MEPs from safe 
parties tend to  serve voters  more than party leaders. Together, these  effects  lend supportive 
evidence to Hypotheses 1 and 2. Finally, Hypothesis 3 is strongly supported:  in all instances 
increasing  personal-vote  seeking  incentives  dampens  negative  slopes  and  serves  to  enhance 
position taking in favor of constituents.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Is there an electoral connection to the European Parliament? This paper challenges the 
conventional scholarly wisdom that there is not. The mixed methods approach has substantiated 
at least three criticisms of the traditional view of the principal-agent relationship between voters 
and legislators in the European Parliament. First, reading the second-order elections model for its 
outcomes rather than its effects on campaigns yields important revisions to the claim that MEPs 
tie themselves most strongly to their national parties‟ reputations in European elections. To the 
contrary, MEPs tie their fates to the principal that can most effectively reduce their electoral 
vulnerability given MEPs‟ expectations about list rank and aggregate party losses in vote share.  
Second, the statistical findings expose an alternative measure of party-loyal behavior that 
is  more  comparable  to  constituent  responsiveness.  The  constituency  –  party  mentions  ratio 
makes clear that MEPs must at times trade off service to the party for service to the constituency 
in floor behavior, and vice versa. Moreover, the qualitative evidence showing that constituency 29 
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service and roll call voting behavior varies with personal vulnerability clearly demonstrates that 
loyalty need not be a binary phenomenon.  
Third, the evidence presented on MEP legislative behavior serves to align theoretical 
expectations with empirical reality. The theory of common agency posits that MEPs will make 
rational choices regarding whom to serve as agents. It evidences this theory with MEPs‟ own 
words  and individual-level  behavioral  data to  reveal  that, while MEPs  intend to  serve three 
different  principals,  when  they  are  forced  to  choose,  they  respond  most  to  the  principals 
responsible for their career‟s longevity. This is the hallmark of the electoral connection.  
The  study  is  certainly  not  without  flaws.  The  measure  of  loyalty  as  speech-target  is 
admittedly  crude  and  it  is  not  necessarily  clear  that  speaking  on  behalf  of  one  principal  or 
another on the floor constitutes “service” to that principal. However, it is a first attempt at testing 
for whether MEPs calculate their loyalties. In that regard, what is more problematic is that this 
design cannot resolve the possibility that serving the national party and serving the constituency 
may be, in MEPs‟ minds, identical tasks. Given that voters do cast ballots for national parties, 
MEPs‟ explanations of votes in plenary may just as likely serve to bolster the party‟s image as 
the  MEPs‟  own.  To  resolve  these  questions,  perhaps  measures  of  “district”  or  “national” 
ideology should be developed as baselines against which to compare MEP nominate scores.  
Finally, even if this paper has succeeded in establishing an electoral connection between 
voters  and  their  MEPs,  this  should  not  be  misconstrued  as  having  established  that  the  EU 
democratic deficit is no longer a concern. The electoral connection is an instrumental, principal-
agent relationship that shapes legislative behavior and organization. The electoral connection 
creates  incentives  for  legislators  to  make  apparent  their  service  to  constituents;  it  does  not 30 
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guarantee that this  service will be anything more than a façade, or  a  pseudo-representation. 
Further  work  is  most  certainly  necessary  to  disentangle  the  organizational  and  normative 
developments in the European Parliament.  
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Table 1: Aggregate Second-Order Election Outcomes (1979 – 2004) 
  EU-15  2004 Accession States 
  Average Gain†  Standard Error  N  Average Gain†  Standard Error  N 
             
Governing Parties  -3.05  0.67  97  -1.23  5.29  12 
Large Parties  -3.00  0.49  162  -5.20  2.25  24 
Opposition Parties  9.50  1.39  22  3.30  2.45  3 
Small Parties  1.20  0.21  420  2.50  0.97  58 
             
Notes:             
Party size is measured as the percent of votes received in most recent national election 
†average gain in percent of votes relative to most recent national election 
Source: Hix and Marsh (2007) 
 
 
Table 2: Electoral Vulnerability and Electoral Connections 
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Table 3: Electoral Vulnerability and Constituency Service 
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Table 4: Electoral Vulnerability and National Party Loyalty 
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Table 5: European Electoral Systems (2004) 
      Country  Ballot Structure  Constituency  Districts 
        Austria  Ordered; single vote  National  1 
Belgium  Ordered; multi-vote  Regional  3 
Cyprus  Ordered; multi-vote  National  1 
Czechia  Ordered; multi-vote  National  1 
Denmark  Open; single vote  National  1 
Estonia  Open; single vote  National  1 
Finland  Open; single vote  National  1 
France  Closed; single vote  Regional  8 
Germany  Closed; single vote  National  1 
Greece  Closed; single vote  National  1 
Hungary  Closed; single vote  National  1 
Ireland  Open; multi-vote  Regional  4 
Italy  Open; multi-vote  Regional  1 
Latvia  Ordered; multi-vote  National  1 
Lithuania  Open; multi-vote  National  1 
Luxembourg  Open; multi-vote  National  1 
Malta  Open; multi-vote  National  1 
Netherlands  Ordered; single vote  National  1 
Poland  Closed; single vote  Regional  1 
Portugal  Closed; single vote  National  1 
Slovakia  Ordered; single vote  National  1 
Slovenia  Ordered; single vote  National  1 
Spain  Closed; single vote  National  1 
Sweden  Ordered; single vote  National  1 
UK - GB  Closed; single vote  Regional  11 
        Notes: 
      Closed lists tend to reduce intraparty electoral competition. Rankings are fixed; voters may not re-
order rankings. Open lists encourage intraparty competition. Voters may re-order lists Ordered Lists 
encourage more intraparty competition than closed lists, but less than open lists. Voters may not re-
order lists, but often may “cumulate” votes to a single candidate as an indicator of preference 
Source: Farrell and Scully (2007). 
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Table 6: Determinants of MEP’s Responsiveness to Constituents and National Parties 
 
     
    Model 1  
   
Model 2 
                   
 
        Coefficient       SE  
 
Coefficient  
 
SE 
Fixed-Effects  
                Intercept  
               
 
Constant      - 0.219  
 
0.025*  
 
- 0.099  
 
0.015* 
 
Party Size  
         
  0.019  
 
0.001* 
 
Opposition Party     
       
  0.021  
 
0.005* 
 
Personal Vote     
       
  0.151  
 
0.011* 
List Rank Slope      - 0.072  
 
0.003*  
 
- 0.081  
 
0.004* 
 
Party Size     
       
- 0.045  
 
0.001* 
 
Opposition Party     
       
  0.107  
 
0.049* 
 
Personal Vote     
       
  0.073  
 
0.050* 
Ambition Slope  
 
- 0.131  
 
0.033*  
 
- 0.110  
 
0.050* 
 
Party Size     
       
  0.002  
 
0.001 
 
Opposition Party  
         
- 0.241  
 
0.119* 
 
Personal Vote     
       
- 0.010  
 
0.003* 
Roll Call Loyalty      0.067  
 
0.022*  
 
  0.078  
 
0.031* 
 
Party Size     
       
  0.051  
 
0.042 
 
Opposition Party     
       
- 0.092  
 
0.013* 
 
Personal Vote     
       
  0.102  
 
0.020* 
Random Effects   Standard Deviation   Variance Component   Standard Deviation  Variance Component 
 
Intercept      0.137  
 
0.019**  
 
0.0978  
 
0.009* 
 
List Rank slope      0.089  
 
0.008**  
 
0.071  
 
0.005* 
 
Ambition slope      0.001  
 
0.000**  
 
0.009  
 
0.000* 
 
level-1      0.164  
 
0.027**  
 
0.1628  
 
0.027* 
Model Fit  
 
Deviance   AIC  
 
Deviance  AIC 
 
N = 255 
 
-332.0  
 
-312  
 
-353.8  
 
-327.8 
 
 